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A commentary on
The body social: an enactive approach to the self
by Kyselo, M. (2014). Front. Psychol. 5:986. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00986
The article byMiriamKyselo titled “The body social: an enactive approach to the self ” (Kyselo, 2014)
raises a crucial issue and discusses how bodily and social aspects may merge together in a unique
account of the human self. The author rightly suggests that we do not have to choose between the
bodily and social dimensions of self.
The integration process between bodily and social self may fail in patients with a number of
neurological and psychiatric diseases, as well as during certain experimental conditions (Lucci and
Pazzaglia, 2015). Various neurological conditions produce disturbed self perceptions, for example
disownership of one’s hand in somatoparaphrenia (Vallar and Ronchi, 2009; Romano et al., 2014),
desire for amputation in body integrity identity disorder (Sedda, 2011), unintended movements
in alien hand syndrome (Della Sala et al., 1991), ownership for supernumerary limbs (Guterstam
et al., 2011) or seeing own body from a third person perspective in out of body experiences (Blanke
and Arzy, 2005). The illusory alterations of awareness of the bodily self can be also induced experi-
mentally during the so-called “rubber hand illusion”—RHI (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998), where the
subjective perceptual experience interfere with bodily self and the external bodily-shaped object is
treated as part of the body. These clinical populations and experimental condition may challenge
Kyselo’s view, as bodily self could be disrupted despite a normal social self.
However, an example of the complementarity of bodily and social self are patients with spinal
cord injury (SCI). “The loss of self is inherent in the social isolation of paralytics, who have further-
more become separated from their bodies by neural damage, and from their former identities by
society” (Murphy, 2001; p. 227). SCI can leave a part of the body insensible and immobile, leading
to specific disorders in the mental representation of one’s own body and the sense of bodily self
(Lenggenhager et al., 2012, 2013). After SCI, patients see their former life slip away and become
restricted, and the social implications can be considerable. They must adapt to their new body and
make significant changes in the way they function in the world. Here we propose that a medium
that accepts self-multiplicity while also offering an integrative perspective on the self is possible. We
consider how an assistive tool can change the manner in which people with massive disconnection
between body and brain access to social world.
For people who chose to integrate their disability into their full sense of self, the wheelchair
represents a changing paradigm, as highlighted by significant theoretical models (Papadimitriou,
2008; Standal, 2011) and experimental studies (Arnhoff andMehl, 1963;Winance, 2006a,b; Higuchi
et al., 2009; Olsson, 2012; Fuentes et al., 2013; Pazzaglia et al., 2013). When patients do not
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perceive the loss or limitation and instead focus on the power
and joy of seeing the world, “I could whiz around and feel the
wind inmy face again. Just being out on the street was exhilarating”
(Austin, 2014), the wheelchair becomes a symbol of both physi-
cal and social independence for the body injured. Even for people
with life-threatening illnesses, this tool provides a way to be out in
the world, continuing their lives and accessing the many realms
of human experience (Karp, 2008).
The plastic shaping of the bodily self has already been demon-
strated bymultiple neuropsychological studies showing that tools
can be integrated into the representation of one’s own body (Mar-
avita and Iriki, 2004; Cardinali et al., 2009; Tsakiris, 2010; Longo
and Serino, 2012). In the process, known as embodiment, the
tool is processed in the same way as a part of one’s body (De
Vignemont, 2011), allowing a new connection between the sense
of having a modified functional body and the sense of self. In
the case of SCI, the wheelchair, which contributes to the indi-
vidual’s conscious movement, can be added to the dynamic rep-
resentation of patients’ bodily self. From a physical perspective,
the corporeal awareness of a tool emerges as the functional self
with its new rules and novel ways of interacting with the world
(Pazzaglia et al., 2013). Through the use of the wheelchair, the
perceived bodily self is that of being functionally whole, enabling
the immobile user to act in the world again.
The wheelchair becomes a vehicle of freedom of mobility and
independence for newly abled adults, reconstructing their sense
of self (Papadimitriou, 2008). A deep embodiment process of the
en-wheeled body can occur, enhanced for both the loss of senso-
rimotor function (Pazzaglia et al., 2013) and the critical sense of
protection and monitoring (Rossetti et al., 2015).
From a social perspective, the injury affects consciousness as
it introduces a novel pervasive identity. The tool incorporation
process described above involves new ways of being in the world,
i.e., the relations between self and others and the world (Winance,
2006a,b; Papadimitriou, 2008). The wheelchair increases per-
meability of the boundary between disabled and non-disabled
individuals, directly mitigating the impairment and thereby help-
ing the user escaping disability (Nario-Redmond et al., 2013).
Functional and smooth wheelchair use significantly contributes
to the production of a new identity and allows the individual to
cope with his disability by emphasizing one’s strengths, interests,
and efficacy. It has the liberating aspect of providing opportu-
nities to participate in social activities, through the new form
of the body. In this case, disablement is not simply a physical
affair; rather, it is a lifelong process of adjusting to changed cir-
cumstances (Pentland et al., 2002) that ultimately results in a
transformation from disabled to newly abled. Being active and
engaged constitutes a starting point for restructuring the social
self. Emerging empirical data support the importance of the
social context in shaping self-perceptions after a SCI (Fuhrer,
1996). Several surveys of patients with SCI revealed that their
self-reported quality of life was only slightly different from that
of control subjects without SCI (Stensman, 1994). Moreover, the
quality of life for this population, regardless of severity of impair-
ment, consisted of various themes (Manns and Chad, 2001) such
as accessibility, emotional well-being, stigma, spontaneity, rela-
tionships and social function, occupation, finances and inde-
pendence, additionally to the expected physical variables such
as functionality and physical well-being. Similarly, patients with
locked-in syndrome can adjust very well to the objective physical
change and actually feel the same as before (Nizzi et al., 2012),
although changes in their self-awareness and quality of life are
not mediated by any functional prosthetic tool, which in this
case would not have the meaning of unifying bodily and activity
extremely restricted of social self.
The effort to understand how people maintain psychological
well-being despite physical and social challenges is a core topic of
many human sciences. The field has shifted from amedical model
of disability as a functional limitation of living without move-
ment and sensation, to a social model that includes consequent
relational problems (Altman, 2001; Williams, 2001; Cole, 2004;
Darling and Heckert, 2010). Both physical and emotional adjust-
ments that follow wheelchair use could result in a new bodily and
social-self representation, in which the person may incorporate
the wheelchair (Fuentes et al., 2013; Pazzaglia et al., 2013). Bodily
changes can affect and be integrated into our self as a disordered
organism regains a state of order (Goldstein, 1939). The fact that
quality of life often equates with social rather than physical sta-
tus (Gosseries et al., 2009) makes sense when the boundaries of
self are not determined by bodily processes alone, but are instead
plastic in terms of relational and social interactions. Although the
relationship between actual bodily states and embodied cogni-
tion has been widely explored, little is known about how changes
in the connection between brain and body periphery, occur-
ring after a traumatic SCI, influence higher-level embodied self
such as perspective-taking, inter-subjectivity and group member-
ship, which makes these topics extremely challenging for future
investigations.
As an individual has to change adaptively (Thompson, 2007)
by flexibly regulating his own identity (Di Paolo, 2005), it is likely
that when discussing individuality, SCI patients do not view their
self as primarily physical or social, but rather including both
aspects of self-definition and the embodiment of the functional
tool that permits them to re-negotiate their self as a whole.
Acknowledgments
Funded by the International Foundation for Research in Para-
plegie (IRP, P133).
References
Altman, B. M. (2001). “Disability definitions, models, classification
schemes, and applications,” in Handbook of Disability Studies, eds
G. L. Albrecht, K. D. Seelman, and M. Bury (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage),
97–122. doi: 10.4135/9781412976251.n4
Arnhoff, F., and Mehl, M. (1963). Body image deterioration in paraplegia. J. Nerv.
Ment. Dis. 137, 88–92. doi: 10.1097/00005053-196307000-00010
Austin, S. (2014). TED Blog. Available online at: http://blog.ted.com/
2013/01/08/see-much-more-of-sue-austins-incredible-wheelchair-art/
Blanke, O., and Arzy, S. (2005). The out-of-body experi-
ence: disturbed self-processing at the temporo-parietal
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 March 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 305
Galli and Pazzaglia A tool for body social
junction. Neuroscientist 11, 16–24. doi: 10.1177/107385840
4270885
Botvinick, M., and Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands ’feel’ touch that eyes see.Nature
391, 756. doi: 10.1038/35784
Cardinali, L., Frassinetti, F., Brozzoli, C., Urquizar, C., Roy, A. C., and Farne, A.
(2009). Tool-use induces morphological updating of the body schema. Curr.
Biol. 19, R478–R479. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2009.06.048
Cole, J. (2004). Still Lives. Cambridge: MIT press.
Darling, R. B., and Heckert, D. A. (2010). “Activism, models, identities, and
opportunities: a preliminary test of a typology of disability orientations, in
Disability as a Fluid State: Research in Social Science and Disability, ed S.
N. Barnartt (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited), 203–229. doi:
10.1108/S1479-3547(2010)0000005011
Della Sala, S., Marchetti, C., and Spinnler, H. (1991). Right-sided anarchic (alien)
hand: a longitudinal study.Neuropsychologia 29, 1113–1127. doi: 10.1016/0028-
3932(91)90081-I
De Vignemont, F. (2011). Embodiment, ownership and disownership. Conscious.
Cogn. 20, 82–93. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.004
Di Paolo, E. (2005). Autopoiesis, adaptivity, teleology, agency. Phenomenol. Cogn.
Sci. 4, 429–452. doi: 10.1007/s11097-005-9002-y
Fuentes, C. T., Pazzaglia, M., Longo, M. R., Scivoletto, G., and Haggard, P. (2013).
Body image distortions following spinal cord injury. J. Neurol. Neurosurg.
Psychiatry 84, 201–207. doi: 10.1136/jnnp-2012-304001
Fuhrer, J. J. (1996). The subjective wee-being of people with spinal cord injury: rela-
tionships to impairment, disability and handicap. Top. Spinal Cord Inj. Reahbil.
1, 56–71.
Goldstein, K. (1939). The Organism: A Holistic Approach to Biology. Boston, MA:
Beacon Press.
Gosseries, O., Bruno, M. A., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Laureys, S., and Schnakers, C.
(2009). “Consciousness in the locked-in syndrome” in The Neurology of Con-
sciousness, eds S. Laureys and G. Tononi (Oxford: Elsevier), 191–203. doi:
10.1016/B978-0-12-374168-4.00015-0
Guterstam, A., Petkova, V. I., and Ehrsson, H. H. (2011). The illusion of owning a
third arm. PLoS ONE 6:e17208. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0017208
Higuchi, T., Hatano, N., Soma, K., and Imanaka, K. (2009). Perception of spatial
requirements for wheelchair locomotion in experienced users with tetraplegia.
J. Physiol. Anthropol. 28, 15–21. doi: 10.2114/jpa2.28.15
Karp, G. (2008). Life on Wheels. New York, NY: Demos Health; Springer
Publishing.
Kyselo, M. (2014). The body social: an enactive approach to the self. Front. Psychol.
5:986. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00986
Lenggenhager, B., Pazzaglia, M., Scivoletto, G., Molinari, M., and Aglioti, S. M.
(2012). The sense of the body in individuals with spinal cord injury. PLoS ONE
7:e50757. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0050757
Lenggenhager, B., Scivoletto, G., Molinari, M., and Pazzaglia, M. (2013). Restoring
tactile awareness through the rubber hand illusion in cervical spinal cord injury.
Neurorehabil. Neural Repair 27, 704–708. doi: 10.1177/1545968313491009
Longo, M. R., and Serino, A. (2012). Tool use induces complex and flexible
plasticity of human body representations. Behav. Brain Sci. 35, 229–230. doi:
10.1017/S0140525X11001907
Lucci, G., and Pazzaglia, M. (2015). Towards multiple interactions of inner and
outer sensations in corporeal awareness. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 9:163. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2015.00163
Manns, P. J., and Chad, K. E. (2001). Components of quality of life for persons with
a quadriplegic and paraplegic spinal cord injury.Qual. Health Res. 11, 795–811.
doi: 10.1177/104973201129119541
Maravita, A., and Iriki, A. (2004). Tools for the body (schema). Trends Cogn. Sci.
8, 79–86. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2003.12.008
Murphy, R. (2001).The Body Silent:The DifferentWorld of the Disabled. NewYork,
NY: W. W. Norton & Company.
Nario-Redmond, M. R., Noel, J. G., and Fern, E. (2013). Redefining
disability, re-imagining the self: disability identification predicts self-
esteem and strategic responses to stigma. Self Identity 12, 468–488. doi:
10.1080/15298868.2012.681118
Nizzi, M. C., Demertzi, A., Gosseries, O., Bruno, M. A., Jouen, F.,
and Laureys, S. (2012). From armchair to wheelchair: how patients
with a locked-in syndrome integrate bodily changes in experienced
identity. Conscious. Cogn. 21, 431–437. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.
10.010
Olsson, C. J. (2012). Complex motor representations may not be pre-
served after complete spinal cord injury. Exp. Neurol. 236, 46–49. doi:
10.1016/j.expneurol.2012.03.022
Papadimitriou, C. (2008). Becoming en-wheeled: the situated accom-
plishment of re-embodiment as a wheelchair user after spinal
cord injury. Disabil. Soc. 23, 691–704. doi: 10.1080/09687590802
469420
Pazzaglia, M., Galli, G., Scivoletto, G., and Molinari, M. (2013). A functionally rel-
evant tool for the body following spinal cord injury. PLoS ONE 8:e58312. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0058312
Pentland, W., Walker, J., Minnes, P., Tremblay, M., Brouwer, B., and Gould, M.
(2002). Women with spinal cord injury and the impact of aging. Spinal Cord
40, 374–387. doi: 10.1038/sj.sc.3101295
Romano, D., Gandola, M., Bottini, G., and Maravita, A. (2014). Arousal
responses to noxious stimuli in somatoparaphrenia and anosognosia:
clues to body awareness. Brain 137, 1213–1223. doi: 10.1093/brain/
awu009
Rossetti, A., Romano, D., Bolognini, N., and Maravita, A. (2015). Dynamic expan-
sion of alert responses to incoming painful stimuli following tool use. Neu-
ropsychologia. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2015.01.019. [Epub ahead of
print].
Sedda, A. (2011). Body integrity identity disorder: from a psychological to a neu-
rological syndrome. Neuropsychol. Rev. 21, 334–336. doi: 10.1007/s11065-011-
9186-6
Standal, O. F. (2011). Re-embodiment: incorporation through embodied learning
of wheelchair skills.Med. Health Care Philos. 14, 177–184. doi: 10.1007/s11019-
010-9286-8
Stensman, R. (1994). Adjustment to traumatic spinal cord injury. A longi-
tudinal study of self-reported quality of life. Paraplegia 32, 416–422. doi:
10.1038/sc.1994.68
Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of
Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Tsakiris, M. (2010). My body in the brain: a neurocognitive
model of body-ownership. Neuropsychologia 48, 703–712. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.034
Vallar, G., and Ronchi, R. (2009). Somatoparaphrenia: a body delusion. A
review of the neuropsychological literature. Exp. Brain Res. 192, 533–551. doi:
10.1007/s00221-008-1562-y
Williams, G. (2001). “Theorizing disability,” in Handbook of Disability Studies,
eds G. L. Albrecht, K. D. Seelman, and M. Bury (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage),
123–144. doi: 10.4135/9781412976251.n5
Winance, M. (2006a). Pain, disability and rehabilitation practices. A
phenomenological perspective. Disabil. Rehabil. 28, 1109–1118. doi:
10.1080/09638280500531800
Winance, M. (2006b). Trying out the wheelchair: the mutual shaping of people
and devices through adjustment. Sci. Technol. Hum. Values 31, 52–72. doi:
10.1177/0162243905280023
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Galli and Pazzaglia. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The
use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in
this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 March 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 305
